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ABSTRACT 
 
Traditionally, 802.11-based networks that relied on wired equivalent protocol (WEP) were especially 
vulnerable to packet sniffing. Today, wireless networks are more prolific, and the monitoring devices used 
to find them are mobile and easy to access. Securing wireless networks can be difficult because these 
networks consist of radio transmitters and receivers, and anybody can listen, capture data and attempt to 
compromise it. In recent years, a range of technologies and mechanisms have helped makes networking 
more secure. This paper holistically evaluated various enhanced protocols proposed to solve WEP related 
authentication, confidentiality and integrity problems. It discovered that strength of each solution depends 
on how well the encryption, authentication and integrity techniques work. The work suggested using a 
Defence-in-Depth Strategy and integration of biometric solution in 802.11i. Comprehensive in-depth 
comparative analysis of each of the security mechanisms is driven by review of related work in WLAN 
security solutions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Wireless network has gained wide deployment due to numerous benefits such as user mobility, 
rapid and cheap installation, flexibility, scalability, and increased productivity it offers. In 
addition, rapid advances in this technology with improved capabilities which is seen in third 
generation (3G) and fourth generation (4G) wireless devices make it attractive for enterprise to 
run their business. However, the use of this novel technology does not go without security risk. 
802.11 network also referred to as WLAN is challenged by lack of physical protection in the 
medium. Moreover, the fact that WLAN device are ship with all security features disabled make 
it a playground for hackers to tread on. Higher percentage of these hacker use to to access internet 
freely and others use it for malicious activites. Traditional WLAN that relies on WEP has security 
flaws that were revealed in FMS attack (2001), Korek attack (2004),  PTW attack (2007), and  
ChopChop  attack (2008), [1]. The consequences of unsecured WLAN are very dangerous to 
users and business enterprise. Attacks pepertrated on the networks have adverse effects on both 
individual users and business enterprises. Currently, the availability of more secured security 
solutions and security deployment best practises has greatly addressed security issues of the 
legacy protocols. This has made many wireless deployments to be probably more secure than the 
wired LAN. This is possible because many of the IEE802.11 standards (802.1X, 802.11i) offer 
security features designed to resolve long standing weakness or address newly discovered ones. 
Researchers have proved the standards to be vulnerable and these are cited in section two of this 
work. To the best of my knowledge this is the first worked that holistically  surveyed and 
evaluated  the outcome of these past researches on  security protocols; 802.1X, WPA , WPA2 ,in 
juxtaposition  to VPN SSL, and VPN IPsec. The objectives of the study are; to give the reader a 
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solid grounding in enhanced WLAN security concepts and technologies solutions at a glance. It 
will equally allow the network administrator to fully assess the risks associated with using 
wireless and how to mitigate the risks.  The main significance of this work is to inform and 
encourage WLAN users to adopt security measures and best practices that help bring down their 
risks to a manageable level. The discussion is focused on their operations, performance impact, 
limitations, possible attacks on them and recommendation of biometric integration on the solution 
and best practices for addressing threats to WLAN. This work did not discuss WEP but provided 
good references for accessing details in WEP. The performance metrics used is based on Strength 
of algorithm used in encryption, authentication and integrity, and are weighted on a four point 
(weak, strong, fairly strong and very strong). In addition, susceptibility to attacks,  and cost of 
implementation are also indicated. The key highlight of the work is that there is no one solution 
that guarantees highly secured network. WLAN requires implementing security at all wireless 
security layers which include wireless signal security, connection security, data protection, device 
security, network protection, and end user protection.  The work is presented in the following 
order: Reviewed literature on WLAN attacks and solutions is done in section2. Section 3 gives an 
overview of enhanced WLAN security solutions. Section 4 presents the comparison of WLAN 
security Protocols. This document presumes that readers have understanding of WLAN 
architecture, possible attacks on them and flaws in WEP and the details on the aforementioned 
background knowledge can be accessed in [2][3]. Readers are encouraged to tailor the solutions 
and recommended guidelines to meet their specific security and business requirements. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
The IEEE 802.11 standards and several researchers have made significant contributions on 
WLAN security aspects. It was examined in [4] how users from the general public understand and 
deal with privacy threats associated with Wi-Fi use. It was found that users lack knowledge of 
immediate risks, and this made them unmindful of privacy and security in using Wifi. It was 
recommended that privacy and Wifi security problem   can be effectively handled through end-
user awareness tools and improving wifi infrastructure. An approach for providing an end-to-end 
wireless security for local area network client/server environment was proposed  and 
implemented in [5]. Performance of encryption algorithms— Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) and 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in terms of time, memory and power were evaluated for 
different devices, key sizes, and the cryptographic algorithms with and without transmission. The 
result of the work showed that both RC4 and AES performed similarly in just about all cases. But 
when transmission of data is considered, RC4 performed slightly better than AES in lightweight 
devices such as on pocket PC that have very limited processing power and memory. The results 
question the reality of relying on secret key crypto system in establishing credentials and data 
protection. A  research  by [6] on IEEE 802.11-2007 Media Access Control (MAC) security in 
union to IPsec concludes that the security provided by the 802.11 standard is successful in 
defending against many popular attacks including: session hijacking, denial-of-service attacks 
against the authenticator, man-in-the-middle attacks, forgery attacks, data manipulation attacks, 
fragmentation attacks, iterative guessing attacks, redirection attacks, and impersonation attacks 
but denial-of service attacks against the supplicant are still possible to achieve. The paper 
concludes that implementing Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) concepts in any part of the Robust 
Security Network Association (RSNA) would successfully prevent denial-of-service attacks. 
IPSec is aimed at Denial of service (DoS) attacks, Spoofing attacks and Man-in-the-middle 
attacks (MITMs). It was report in [7] that Verisign has issued two digital certificates to someone 
who improperly posed as a representative of Microsoft. This indicates that a sufficiently 
motivated attacker’s ability to forge credentials may exceed the ability of the Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) provider to detect them.  There is need to adopt in IPSec, a mechanism that 
permits secure administration and distribution of keys such that public keys are associated to 
intended entities that owns them. WPA and IEEE 802.11i was evaluated in [8] to be robust to a 
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lot of attacks. However, they presented scenarios that produce a DoS attack and DoS flooding 
attacks on these protocols and finally proposed Static and Dynamic 4-WayHandshake solutions to 
avoid the attacks. Secure Angle enabled access point that uses angles of arrival (AoA) was 
designed to operate alongside existing wireless security protocols to enable a “virtual fence” that 
drops frames injected into the network from a client physically located outside a building, and 
prevent malicious parties from spoofing the link-layer address of legitimate clients. In preventing 
spoofing attack, the administrator manually certifies a legitimate client’s signature and compares 
it against the incoming packets.  They envisaged a challenge of signatures changing to some 
degree when obstacles in the environment move, and therefore are of the opinion that signatures 
must be tracked and updated. However, the exact signature specifications  are left as an open 
research question [9]. In my own view, it appears that the Secure Angle will work on only 
802.11n APs as there is no statement on whether other IEEE 802.11 specifications such as 
802.11a, 802.11b, and 802.11g can support the system.  Also I perceived that this approach does 
not support user mobility which is one of the benefit of WLAN. Address Resolution Protocol 
(ARP) [10] spoofing was demonstrated on WPA-enabled network and the work equally showed 
that in a real world scenario, using strong password in WPA network is brekable [1]. It was 
argued in [11]  that WPA was not really cracked. According to him, the vulnerability seen in 
WPA was due to a poor deployment of WPA-PSK. He stated that a simple 10-character alpha-
numeric random PSK (or greater) will make WPA unable to be cracked with dictionary attacks. 
The benefits of Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) over previous protocols and the vulnerabilities 
was  explored in [12]. Available modes to secure a wireless network using the WPA2 protocol 
were also discussed. Suggestions on how the protocol vulnerabilities might be addressed through 
enhancements or new protocols were made.  Patch solution and a new algorithm for dummy 
authentication key-establishment  was proposed  in [13]. Study conducted by [14] demonstrated 
weakness in  nonce construction and transmission mechanism used in Counter Mode with Cipher 
Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol (CCMP) that made it vulnerable to time 
memory trade off (TMTO) pre-computation attack. The solution on how the attack can be 
prevented was not given. A biometrics approach to WLAN security was presented in [15], in 
which user’s iris was used by the  network server for authentication. 
 
3. OVERVIEW OF WLAN SECURITY EXTENSIONS 
 
Service Set Identifier (SSID), MAC Address Filtering and wired equivalent protocol (WEP) were 
the original 802.11 specifications  by the IEEE for securing WLAN. These mechanisms lead to a 
number of practical attacks that demonstrate their failure to achieving security goals. Alternative 
security mechanisms such as 802.Ix, 802.11i, SSL, and IPsec, were created to enhance WLAN 
security and are discussed below. Virtual Private Networks (VPN) is deployed in an enterprise 
wired network for secured data transmission. Its success made it attractive to wireless developers 
and administrators as security option in an enterprise WLANs  
 
VPN technology provides three levels of security; Authentication, Encryption and Data 
authentication. VPN server authenticates every user that uses VPN client to connect to the 
WLAN. It provide data confidentiality by encrypting the traffic passing through the secure tunnel 
created on top of the in-secured internet medium. It also guarantees that all traffic is from 
authenticated devices. The network topology diagram in Fig. 1 presents a hybrid solution where 
both VPN and Wi-Fi security are deployed in an enterprise network.  
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Figure 1.  VPN and Wi-Fi security  
 
The VPN gateway permits secured access for internet users and the access points offers secured 
connectivity for local devices. Wi-Fi association is granted through access control and 
authentication. Encryption occurs at layer two and above and is hardware based. Centralized 
RADIUS authentication model is implemented here, in which the network access devices (access 
points and VPN gateway ) forward RADIUS authentication requests to the RADIUS server for 
verification. This is used to provide true single sign-on for both Wi-Fi and VPN security.    
 
3.1. IPsec 
 
IPsec is “a framework of open standards for ensuring secure private communications over IP 
networks through the use of cryptographic security services.” It consists of two separate security 
protocols, Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulated Security Protocol (ESP) that ensures the 
authenticity and integrity of the data. AH authenticates packets by signing them. The signature is 
specific to the packet being transmitted, and therefore prevents the data from being modified 
(integrity).  In addition to handling the authenticity and integrity of data ESP ensures data 
confidentiality through encryption, digital signature, and/or secure hashes. When AH and ESP are 
implemented together the entire packet is authenticated. IPSec uses Internet Key Exchange (IKE) 
mechanism to authenticate end users and manage secret keys by providing a secure exchange of a 
pre-shared key before IPSec transmissions begin. IKE is not reliable and could end up in a dead 
state. Dead-Peer-Detection was an improvement in IKE to handle dead state occurrence due to 
reliability flaws. IPSec uses security association (SA) to describe how parties will use AH and 
encapsulating security payload to communicate. The SA can be established through manual 
intervention or by using the Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol 
(ISAKMP). ISAKMP approach has advantage over IKE; duplication of functionality in each 
security protocol is minimal and it uses little time in setting up Communication. IPSec is a widely 
used VPN protocol.  IPSec VPNs can be deployed in either transport mode or tunnel mode. In 
transport mode the IPSec-protected data is carried in IP packets that use the original IP addresses 
of the two VPN peers. Transmission here is faster since the IP headers are not encrypted, and the 
packets are smaller. The disadvantage in this mode is that a hacker can sniff the network and 
gather information about end parties. The Tunnel mode encapsulates and encrypts all IP packets 
and ensures end-to-end transmission using new IP header of the two VPN peers. Tunnel mode is 
used in host-to gateway or gateway-to-gateway VPNs. IPsec uses Triple DES (3DES), or 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to ensure confidentiality of IP traffic. 
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3.2. Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 
 
SSL consists of two protocols, the SSL record protocol that defines the format used to transmit 
data and the SSL handshake protocol that uses the record protocol to exchange messages between 
the SSL-enabled server and the client when they establish a connection [7]. SSL is used in VPN 
to protect transmitted data. SSL VPN solution for WLAN provides the following functionality; 
Centralized security and management, strong and scalable data encryption for maximum security 
and to secure most sensitive transactions such as online banking on the Internet, “auto reconnect.” 
feature of SSL VPN supports mobility of users, scalability and provides endpoint security. SSL 
addresses the need of confidentiality integrity and authentication. Confidentiality is achieved by 
using public key cryptography. Data integrity is preserved by performing a special calculation 
(hash function) on the contents of the message and storing the result with the message itself. The 
SSL protocol uses Message authentication codes (MAC) to provide data integrity. It uses Ron 
Rivest,Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman (RSA) algorithm for encryption. The result of the 
algorithm depends both on the message and the key used. The attacker has no access to the key, 
and therefore lacks capacity to modify both the message and the digest. SSL uses digital 
certificates for authentication. Digital certificates contains information such data as the server’s 
name, public encryption key, and the trusted Certificate Authority (CA).  
 
Connection between the client and server is negotiated through a handshake procedure. Here, the 
client connects to the SSL-enabled server and requests that the server sends back information in 
the form of a digital certificate. The server can require the client to present a valid certificate as 
well but this is optional. The client checks the validity of the server certificate. When the 
handshake phase ends, data exchanged between the client and server is then used with hashing 
functions to generate session keys that are used for encryption, decryption and tamper detection 
of data throughout the SSL session.  According to [16], quantum cryptography that relies on 
photon and uses key longer than 128-bit or 256-bit keys will provide better protection than RSA 
algorithm. It will make data  communication  potentially unhackable  and guarantee security 
against future computer improvements. 
 
3.3. 802.IX/EAP 
 
IEEE 802.IX is specified for port-based network access control for wired networks and has been 
extended for use in wireless networks. It provides user-based authentication, access control and 
implements Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), which was originally designed for Point-
to Point Protocol (PPP). EAP  is a  layer 3 protocol and can use any authentication mechanism to 
add flexibility to 802.1X . 802.IX uses; 
 
1. The Supplicant: A station that requests access to the network offered by the authenticator. 
It dialogue with the authentication server through the authenticator. 
2. The Authenticator: Typically a wireless access point that controls the state of each port 
(open/close) and mediates an authentication session between the client and the 
authentication server. 
3. The Authentication Server:  This is a Remote Authentication Dials In User Service 
(RADIUS) server that do the authentication process for the authenticato. 
 
802.1X and EAP approach are characterized by three main elements that make it better than the 
basic 802.11 securities. They are: 
 
1. Mutual authentication between client and authentication (Remote Access Dial-In user 
Service (Radius) server. 
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2. Encryption keys dynamically derived after authentication 
3. Centralized policy control, that stimulate re-authentication and fresh encryption key 
generation when a session expires. 
 
EAP Authentication Process is shown in Fig.2 and the sequence of events are numbered 
1-9.  
 
 
Figure 2.   EAP Authentication Process 
 
Here, user login credentials must be provided through an EAP supplicant before wireless client 
can associate with access point. When association is established, the client and the RADIUS 
mutually authenticate each other via the access point. The  RADIUS server and the client  then 
determine a session key (WEP key) that it distinct to the client. The RADIUS server sends the a 
session key to the access point via the wired LAN. The access point in turn, encrypts its broadcast 
key with the session key and sends the encrypted key to the client. The client uses the session key 
to decrypt it. These keys are valid for all communications during the remainder of the session or 
until the session expires. A new WEP key is then generated. The session key and broadcast key 
are changed at regular intervals and can be configured on the access point.  Different types of  
EAP that can be used in wireless network for user authentication include LEAP_Cisco Wireles 
(LEAP), EAP-Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS), Protected EAP (PEAP), EAP-tunneled TLS 
(EAP-TTLS) and EAP-Subscriber.  
 
3.4. IEEE 802.11i 
 
IEEE 802.11i  defines Robust Security Network (RSN)” [17] that is aimed solving the problems 
in 802.11b and WEP which include Poor Privacy, lack of encryption key management, Weak 
authentication and authorization and no Accounting. The RSN adopts an approach that grants the 
authenticated entity a set of privileges for a limited amount of time.  Devices joining in a RSN 
need to support Counter Mode-CBC MAC protocol (CCMP), a protocol built around the 
IEEE802.1X standard for access control and AES. These two protocols made RSN a stronger and 
scalable solution [17]. WEP users using RC4 requires hardware upgrades to join CCMP users. To 
address this problem RSN allows the use of Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP), which 
allows WEP systems to be upgraded to be secure. To support the transition from WEP to TKIP, a 
network model called transition security network was defined. Transition security Network allows 
pre-robust security Network associations. This means that WEP users using RC4 can coexist 
within the same wireless local area network with CCMP users who use AES and TKIP users who 
use RC4 and security enhancements [18]. 
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3.5. Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) 
 
TKIP was temporally provided to mitigate the security challenge of  WEP in combination with 
802.1x authentication and EAP-TLS. It uses 802.IX for key management and establishment. 
TKIP uses a key scheme based on RC4, but extends this key hierarchy to include a key hash 
function, and a message integrity check (MIC). The key hash function reduces the exposure of the 
master secret and to provide per-packet key mixing. TKIP hashes the combination of the IV 
value, the data encryption key (derived from the master secret), and the MAC address to form the 
traffic key. This mechanism addresses the WEP problem and then reduces the ability of the 
related key attack.   
 
3.6. Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) 
 
Wi-Fi Protected Access is a WLAN data encryption method that uses TKIP to alleviate WEP key 
flaw by generating a new 128-bit per packet transmitted. [3]. WPA enhances WEP by adding a re-
keying mechanism to provide a fresh encryption and integrity key. Temporal keys are changed for 
every 10,000 packets. This makes it much harder to crack TKIP keys than with WEP. In WPA, a 
temporal encryption key, transmit address and TKIP Sequence Counter (TSC) form the input to 
the RC4 algorithm that generates a keystream. MAC Service Data Unit (MSDU) and Message 
Integrity Check (Michael) are combined using the Michael algorithm. The combination of the 
MSDU and the MIC is fragmented to generate MAC Protocol Data Units, which is MPDU. From 
the MPDU, a 32-bit Integrity Check Value is calculated for the MPDU. The combination PDU 
and the ICV is bit-wise exclusive ORed with a keystream to produce the encrypted data. The IV is 
added to the encrypted data to generate the MAC frame. According to [19], Michael is not a very 
strong algorithm. However, it was the best choice given the constraints. 
 
3.7. WPA2 
 
This is an enhancement to WPA. It uses AES algorithm for encryption which is stronger than 
TKIP. AES in combination with Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining Message 
Authentication Code Protocol (CCMP) provide high level security to WLAN. The CCMP 
algorithm creates message integrity code (MIC) to protect data integrity. WPA2 supports both 
Enterprise mode and Personal mode. WPA2 Personal uses a set of password. WPA2 Enterprise 
uses EAP and a RADIUS server for centralized client authentication using multiple authentication 
methods such as token cards, Kerberos, and certificates. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  WPA2 CCMP Procedure 
 
 During the CCMP procedure, the MAC header produces additional authentication data (AAD) 
that is added to the CCM encryption process. This protects the frame against alteration of the non 
encrypted portions of the frame. A sequence packet number PN is included in the CCMP header 
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to protect against replay attacks. The PN and the portions of the MAC header are used to generate 
a nonce that is turned, is used by the CCM encryption process. In WPA and WPA2 keys are 
derived during the four-way handshake shown in Fig. 4 Encryption keys are derived from the 
Pairwise Master Key. The PMK is derived during the EAP Authentication Session. In the EAP 
success message, the Pairwise Master Key is sent to the access point, but it is not directed to the 
Wi-Fi client as it has derived its own copy of the Pairwise Master Key.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.  The Four-Way Handshake 
 
1. A client uses the nonce sent by the access point to generate the Pairwise Transient Key 
(PTK).   
2. The client responds with its own nonce value, an Snonce, to the access point together 
with a message integrity check code which is Michael.  
3. The access point sends the groupwise transient key (GTK) and a sequence number 
together with another MIC which is used in the next broadcast frames.  
4. The client confirms that the temporal keys are installed.  
 
4. DISCUSSION  
 
Table 1  presented different security standards and solutions such as 802.1x, 802.11i, VPN based 
SSL and VPN based IPSec, as enhancement to WEP which has several flaws that make the 
systems that implemented it vulnerable to attackers.  
 
Table 1. Enhanced  Wlan Security Comparison 
 
   802.1x 802.11i  
 SSL based 
VPN 
IPsec 
based VPN 
EAP with TKIP WPA WPA2 
FEATURES LEAP PEAP TLS   
Encryption 
algorithm 
RSA key 
exchange 
3DES or 
AES 
RC4  RC4  RC4  RC4-TKIP AES-
CCMP 
Key length  1024- 4096 
bit 
168/128, 
192, 256 bit 
128 bit 128 bit 128 bit 128 bit 128-192-
256 bit 
IV length      48 bit 48 bit 
Authentication Mutual Mutual Mutual Mutual Mutual Mutual Mutual 
Certificate 
requirements  
SSL-
enabled 
Server 
Optional NONE RADIUS 
server 
RADIUS 
server/ 
WLAN 
client 
RADIUS 
serve 
RADIUS 
serve 
Packet 
Integrity 
MAC MD5-
HMAC/  
SHA-
HMAC  
CRC-
32/MIC  
CRC-
32/MIC  
CRC-
32/MIC  
MIC CCM-
MIC 
Key type Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic 
Key 
distribution 
 Digital 
certificate 
Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic 
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Single sign-on 
support  
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Open standard NO Yes No IETF draft 
RFC 
Yes IEEE 
802.11i 
IEEE 
802.11i 
ATTACKS        
MITM (active 
attacks) 
Alleviated Vulnerable Alleviated Alleviated Alleviated Vulnerable Alleviated 
Dos Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable Alleviated 
Rogue access 
points  
Alleviated  Alleviated Alleviated Alleviated Vulnerable Alleviated 
Passive 
attacks (FMS 
paper) 
Alleviated Alleviated Alleviated Alleviated Alleviated Vulnerable Alleviated 
Brute-force 
dictionary 
attacks 
Vulnerable  Alleviated Vulnerable 
with weak 
password  
Alleviated Alleviated Vulnerable 
with weak 
password 
Alleviated 
Authentication 
forging  
Alleviated Alleviated Alleviated Alleviated Alleviated Vulnerable 
with weak 
password 
Alleviated 
OSI LAYER Layer 4 Layer 3 Layer 3 Layer 3 Layer 4  Layer 2 Layer 2 
 
These enhanced solutions offer security at different layers of Open System Interconnect (OSI) 
model and   provide confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and availability which is the basic 
security requirements needed in a secured network. Each uses encryption algorithm and 
authentication algorithm shown in the table to ensure secured network. The performance of  any 
of the solutions is dependent on the algorithm and protocols supported. Key length supported by 
each of these WLAN solutions are shown in the table. Authentication between client and server is 
mutual but in SSL Client authentication is optional. Using a password-based scheme should 
require the use of some form of mutual authentication so that the authentication process is 
protected against brute-force dictionary attacks. Brute-force dictionary attacks against LEAP can 
be mitigated if strong password is used. It is a good practise for IT administrators to reduce the 
number of login attempts before an account is locked. Users should be educated on the danger of 
passing out their username and password to any screen that pop up. The use of one time token 
should be adopted in build application that run online. When implementing EAP, dictionary 
attacks can be avoided by using non-password-based schemes such as biometrics, certificates, 
OTP, Smart Cards, and token cards.  
 
According to [12], WPA2 is vulnerable to RF jamming attack, Layer 2 session hijacking and data 
flooding attack. In addition, management frames report network topology and modify client 
behaviour. This facilitates the ability of an attacker to see network layout, discover device 
location and launch Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Various researches reviewed in section 2 of 
this work show that the enhanced solutions and standards are still vulnerable to various attacks 
they are meant to fight but has made hacking process difficult for the attacker. Unless 
administrators protect their wireless infrastructure with proven tools and techniques, engage in 
security awareness training, establish standards and policies that identify proper deployment and 
security methodology, the integrity of wireless networks will be threatened.  
 
The nature of Wireless communication (over the air) made it vulnerable to passive, active, MITM 
,and jamming attacks. A passive attack occurs when someone eavesdrops on network traffic. 
Cheap availability of wireless network adapter that supports promiscuous mode as well as easily 
available tools such as Network Monitor in Microsoft products, TCPDump in Linux-based 
products, NetStumbler, or AirSnort which can be used to  capture network traffic for analysis 
make detecting and reporting on wireless networks  a  hobby for many wireless wardriving 
enthusiasts. Disabling SSID broadcast will make the AP not respond to “empty set”SSID beacons 
and will consequently be “invisible” to network traffic analysis tools. However, it is still possible 
to capture the “raw”802.11b frames and decode them 
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(formerly Ethereal) and Wild Packet’s AiroPeek to determine the information.  Once an attacker 
has gained sufficient information from a passive attack, they can launch an active such as  
spoofing, DoS, flooding attacks,  introduction of malware and the theft of devices   against the 
network. DoS and flooding attacks can take place once an attacker has authenticated and 
associated with a wireless network. This can be achieved through the placement and use of rogue 
access points that prevent wireless traffic from being forwarded properly. Placing a rogue AP 
within range of a wireless station is a wireless-specific variation of a MITM attack. This attack 
can be used to gain valuable information about a wireless network, such as authentication 
requests, the secret key, read private  data from a session or to modify the packets thus violating 
the integrity of a session. Because of their undetectable nature, the only defense against rogue 
APs is vigilance through frequent site surveys (using tools such as directional or parabolic dish 
antennae, GPS receivers NetStumbler, Wireshark. and AiroPeek,) and physical security.  Rogue 
access point detection provide a first-level of defence against someone exploiting an access point, 
but even if they do exploit it, deploying SSL VPN will provide additional layer of security 
through protection of  critical applications and data.  It should be noted that NetStumbler will not 
identify other DoS attacks or other non-networking equipment that is causing conflicts (such as 
wireless telephones, wireless security cameras, amateur TV (ATV) systems, RF-based remote 
controls, wireless headsets, microphones and audio speakers, and other devices that use the 2.4 
GHz frequency). Spoofing and unauthorized attacks can be protected using MAC filtering to 
allow only clients that possess valid MAC addresses to access the wireless network. However, 
MAC addresses are sent in the plain on wireless networks and therefore can easily be changed 
using edit of the registry in windows or a root shell command in UNIX. A better protection 
requires the following additional measures; using RADIUS or SecurID,  use of VPN to access the 
wired network, allow only SSH access or SSL-encrypted traffic into the network and use of 
firewall to isolate unwanted access. 
 
4.1. Enhanced 801.11 Security Protocols Performance Evaluation 
 
Strength of algorithm used in encryption, authentication and integrity was used to measure the 
performance of the enhanced 801.11 Security Protocols. They are weighted on a four point scale 
(weak, strong, fairly strong and very strong). In addition, susceptibility to attacks and cost of 
implementation are also indicated. 
 
Table 2. Performance Evaluation for Enhanced 801.11 Security Protocols 
 
   802.1x 802.11i  
METRICS SSL 
based 
VPN 
IPsec based 
VPN 
EAP with TKIP WPA WPA2 
Algorithm 
Strength 
LEAP PEAP TLS   
Encryption  Very 
Strong 
(RSA) 
Very Strong 
(3DESor AES) 
Weak 
(RC4 ) 
Weak 
(RC4 ) 
Weak 
(RC4 ) 
Strong    
(RC4-
TKIP) 
Very Strong 
(AES-
CCMP) 
Authentication Strong 
(Digital 
Signature) 
Strong             
(AH &ESP) 
Weak 
(password) 
 
Fairly 
Strong 
(PEAP) 
Strong 
(Digital 
Certificates) 
Strong 
(EAP) 
 
Strong  
(EAP) 
Packet Integrity Strong 
(MAC) 
 
Strong         
(MD5-HMAC/  
SHA-HMAC ) 
 
Fairly 
Strong 
(CRC-32/ 
MIC ) 
Fairly 
Strong           
(CRC-32 
/MIC ) 
Fairly 
Strong 
(CRC-32 / 
MIC) 
Fairly 
Strong 
(MIC) 
Very Strong 
(CCM-MIC) 
Susceptibility 
to Attacks 
Low Low High Low Low Low Very Low 
Cost of Imple -
mentation 
High High Low Low Moderate Low High 
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1. Strength of Algorithm 
 
VPN ensures a higher degree of confidentiality for traffics. It is difficult for hacker to crack the 
VPN encryption to see the corporate traffics. If a wireless device is stolen and the theft 
unreported, the thief would have to know the user credentials to gain access to the VPN. IPSec 
and SSL are commonly used protocols in VPN to provides for confidentiality of IP traffic, and  
secure data during transmission . IPSec achieves confidentiality using 3DESor AES. SSL secure 
most sensitive online transactions such as online banking. It uses digital certificate for 
authentication, RSA algorithm for encryption and MAC for data integrity 
 
Unlike WEP that that uses pre-shared key for authentication which is easily cracked by attacker, 
802.1X uses EAP that provides three significant benefits over WEP, the mutual authentication 
scheme effectively eliminate MITM attacks. The dynamic distribution of keys prevent lost 
wireless device from gaining unauthorized access. The centralized policy control enables re-
authentication and new key generation. access can us different types of EAP to authenticate users. 
EAP is a standard authentication method for both WPA and WPA2. There are many types of EAP 
implementation (LEAP, PEAP, and EAP-TLS) which contributes to its flexibility. LEAP uses 
passwords for authentication, and does not use digital certificates. Information transported by 
LEAP is often visible to attackers. User credentials are not strongly protected in LEAP, and are 
thus easily compromised. PEAP was created as a more secure means of authentication than EAP. 
It uses an encrypted and authenticated TLS tunnel to send EAP authenticated data. The EAP-TLS 
algorithm can derive dynamic WEP keys, and the authentication server will send the client the 
WEP key for use during that session. EAP-TLS is highly secure because it uses certificate-based 
algorithms and it is hard to crack certificate digitally signed by a CA. 
 
WPA uses RC4 in addition to TKIP. It uses TKIP to encrypt data which enables keys rotation so 
that every data packet uses a unique encryption key. This makes transmitted data more difficult to 
hack. TKIP provides a solution to WEP’s checksum issues, by using a larger, more secure 48-bit 
IV, and transmits the IV as an encrypted hash. WPA2 uses AES algorithm for encryption and 
CCMP for data encryption. CCMP is currently the strongest protocol for encrypting data in a 
WPA2 network. AES provides much stronger encryption than RC4 and TKIP. 
 
2. Susceptibility to Attacks  
 
In 802.11X, certain “flavors”of RADIUS servers and Web servers can be compromised by buffer-
overflow attacks. A buffer-overflow attack occurs when a buffer is flooded with more information 
than it can hold. The extra data overflows  into other buffers, which may be accessible to hackers. 
Thus, IEEE 802.1x is susceptible to several attacks, due to the following vulnerabilities: 
 
1. The lack of the requirement of strong mutual authentication. While EAP-TLS does provide 
strong mutual authentication it is not required and can be overridden. 
2.  The vulnerability of the EAP Success message to a MITM attack. 
3. The lack of integrity protection for 802.1x management frames. 
 
However, the networks are not as vulnerable as they would be without EAP and 802.1x. 
Vulnerabilities seen in other solution in Table 2 are discussed in section 2 of this paper. They are 
comparatively low when compared with WEP. WPA2 still remains the most current secured layer 
2 protocol . 
 
3. Cost of Implementation 
 
Solutions based on 802.11X are generally more cost effective than those based on VPN for two 
reasons: First, with 802.1X, the infrastructure is already put in place is augmented. Secondly, the 
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complexity associated with setting up and maintaining VPNs may require more of staff time to 
manage. Distributing VPN access to remote sites requires installation or adding capacity to a 
VPN server at that site, and setting up all WLAN users outside the firewall. It is easy to distribute 
802.1X-based WLAN access to separate departments, floors and other off-site locations with little 
administrative overhead. 
 
In WPA, transition from WEP to TKIP is cheap when compared to WPA2. The 802.11i standard 
requires AES as a replacement for the compromised RC4 algorithm. However, because of the 
additional processing power required for AES encryption, the addition of a co-processor is likely 
necessary in wireless device hardware and will make upgrading legacy wireless devices to 
support AES very costly.  As with all other security measures, administrators and managers will 
have to compare the costs of implementation against the threats the implementation will mitigate. 
 
4.2. Using a Defence-in-Depth Strategy 
 
Agencies can mitigate risks to their WLANs by applying Defence-in-Depth Strategy as shown in 
Fig.5 to address specific threats and vulnerabilities.  
 
Use VPN Tunnel
Encryption
 
Figure 5.   Security In-Dept Approach 
 
The defense-in-depth strategy  specifies the use of multiple layers of network security. This can 
be achieved by  
 
1. Collecting, analyzing and assessing security events in real time using  Wireless Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) and a security information and event management (SIEM) solution 
such as HP’s ArcSight. Additional layer of security  can be applied the network by 
disabling Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol ( DHCP). 
2.  Per-packet authentication using RADIUS and  centralized encryption and security 
management using SSL VPN  for connection security . 
3.  WPA2 and AES for Data Protection.  Also Using HTTPS instead of HTTP will ensure  
application layer encryption for a session with a secure web server  
4. use vulnerabilities and patches for device security  
5. deploy a stateful per user firewall  for End user protection  
6. auditing, and VPN, IPSec, biometrics for access control. Use strong authentication for  
network access protection . 
7.  Use of encrypted proxy services that allows access to the web server, but with an encrypted 
tunnel at the local end. 
8. Change all default settings, such as passwords and service set identifiers, or SSIDs.  
 
Biometrics provides added layer of protection and can be integrated with wireless smart cards or 
other wireless device. It can as well combine with VPN solutions to provide authentication and 
data confidentiality. It is very difficult to guess physical human characteristics and this made 
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biometric-based authentication highly reliable when compared to password-based authentication. 
Other counter measures include disable the network when not required, and place wireless access 
points in a secured location. Planning the Wi-Fi RF coverage area include proper placement of 
wireless access points and appropriate shielding using thin layer of aluminum under the drywall 
within the building where possible. Control all access points’ power levels, but not to level 
that legitimate device on the network can no longer connect. These will substantially 
alleviate RF jamming attack and makes the network highly available. Some wireless interface 
cards or their drivers cannot capture any packets that are not addressed to the device. Such 
devices would not allow sniffing on the wireless portion of the network.  
 
It is necessary to highlight that Wi-Fi security standards cannot handle AP failure. They equally 
lack capacity to handle attacks on physical layer since they provide security on layer two and 
above. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
 
This paper evaluated alternative security mechanisms for WLAN; 802.1X and 802.11i , VPN, 
IPSec, and SSL. The result of the discussion shows that there is no one solution that is the best. 
Security problem and mitigation is a continuous process as long as swift changes in wireless 
technology exist. However, WPA2 is still far more secure than other 802.11options and is still in 
common use. Therefore achieving secured WLAN requires implementing security at all layers 
which include wireless signal security, connection security, data protection, device security, 
network protection, and end user protection. Organizations should perform a risk analysis of their 
network, develop, and implement relevant and comprehensive security policies throughout their 
network. Users should be educated on the operation, security and safe computing practices of 
both wired and wireless networks. This work recommended the use of biometric cryptosystem in 
place of user name and password for a more secured user authentication. Quantum cryptography 
is also a likely solution for future machines with exponentially more processing power than 
today's technology. 
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